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Torture is one of the most prohibited practices in international society and has become 
a symbol of cruel and unnecessary suffering. Despite this absolute prohibition, torture 
is widely practiced by states around the world. This disparity between the prohibition 
of torture and the practice of states raises fundamental questions about the role and 
power of moral norms in world politics. Does the torture taboo matter? Or are political 
realists correct in arguing that power politics rules?      
 This thesis makes the paradoxical argument that despite its widespread 
violation, not only does the torture taboo matter, but that its strength can be found by 
studying its violation. The torture taboo constitutes state identities and interests and 
shapes state actions. Even during times of security crisis, the torture taboo is not 
forgotten. States hide, deny, and re-define their torture, outsource it to other states, or 
use techniques that do not leave marks on the body. The fact states go to such great 
lengths to hide their use of torture demonstrates not the weakness of the taboo, but 
rather its strength.          
 In order to demonstrate the power of the torture taboo, and explain why states 
deny their use of torture, I trace a genealogy of the taboo from the eighteenth century 
to the twenty first century. I show how international society came to understand torture 
the way it does today. I show also that the taboo has not developed in a linear fashion, 
but has become more robust over time due to a series of fortuitous events, and, most 
surprisingly, in response to widespread inhumanity. By showing that the history of the 
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torture taboo is also a story about what it means to be human, I seek to show that the 
taboo contains normative values immanent in the present that are integral to 
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Torture is one of the most condemned practices in world politics and is absolutely 
prohibited in international society. No country would dare openly torture. Nor would a 
country dare have a policy advocating torture. “No society on earth,” says Hajjar 
(2008, 235), “advances the claim that torture, as legally defined, is a valued or integral 
part of its cultural heritage or political culture.” The UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, stated in 2009, “[t]orture is a barbaric act. I believe no 
state whose regime conducts or condones torture can consider itself civilized” (Human 
Rights Watch 2010, 1). This condemnation stands in stark contrast to the widespread 
violation of the torture taboo. In an Amnesty International (2000) report released in 
2000, it found that 150 countries engaged in torture or ill-treatment.   
 The above paragraph raises three heavily intertwined issues. The first is the 
concern to abolish unnecessary harm and violence in world politics. The second 
concerns the progress that has been made in achieving those goals. And the third 
concerns how we have come to understand ourselves as “civilized” human beings. All 
three issues relate to how the torture taboo has shaped our behaviour, the types of 
obligations we have toward one another, and the limits imposed upon states to hurt 
individuals. The attempt to ameliorate harm and restrict what Linklater (2011) has 
called the state’s “power to hurt” has been a prominent theme in international relations 
theory. Yet for something that is deemed so important, a study of the torture taboo has 
been heavily neglected in international relations scholarship. What role does the torture 
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taboo play in world politics? Given its widespread violation, does the torture taboo 
matter? Have we kept pace with the state’s power to hurt? (Linklater 2011, 258). 
 To suggest that a cosmopolitan norm such as the torture taboo matters in world 
politics would be treated with scepticism by some. The realist would respond by telling 
us to stop being so naïve. Can’t you see that violence has characterised international 
politics for centuries! To succumb to idealism is dangerous and ignores the fact that 
one cannot engage in politics without getting their hands “dirty”! States are in intense 
competition with one another and the primary concern of the state is its security and 
survival. Concerns about transgressing universal moral principles are overshadowed by 
the realities of the logic of anarchy and the hegemonic influence of material interests.
 Such a position represents a form of pessimism that I seek to challenge in this 
thesis. I show that despite widespread violations of the taboo in international society, 
states hide, deny, re-define and outsource their torture. Just because states may at times 
violate the taboo does not mean the taboo ceases to matter. Humanitarian pressures 
continue to operate on states even during times of necessity. This can provide hope of 
escaping the realist logic of power politics by capturing these humanitarian norms to 
bring about normative change in world politics. Violations do not demonstrate the 
weakness of the taboo, as realism would suggest, but offer a valuable site in which to 
examine its strength.          
 Yet this thesis also explores how torture came to have the meanings it does, 
and how these historically contingent meanings have influenced identities, interests 
and actions in world politics. Why is torture taboo? Why does it have the meaning that 
it has? What factors have resulted in this prohibition? And do our understandings of 
the torture taboo continue to change over time? Despite an absolute prohibition on 
torture, other forms of violence and harm do not receive the same level of prohibition. 
We continue to go to war with one another, leave open the opportunity to use nuclear 
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weapons in stringent circumstances (see Tannenwald 2007), and allow exceptions to 
the taboo against murder. What separates torture apart from these other forms of 
violence that can inflict the same, if not more, physical harm on the human body?  
 Nietzsche (2003, 1) famously declared, “We are unknown, we knowers, 
ourselves to ourselves: this has its own good reason. We have never searched for 
ourselves – how should it then come to pass, that we should ever find ourselves?” 
Recent studies on torture have focused on the use of torture in the recent “war on 
terror” (Dunne 2007; Foot 2006; Roberts 2007), whether torture should be used against 
“ticking-bomb” terrorists (Allhoff 2003; Bagaric and Clarke 2005; Bellamy 2006; 
Dershowitz 2002; Ignatieff 2005; Levinson 2004; Shue 2006; Walzer 1973), the 
characteristics that make torture immoral (Scarry 1985, 139-157; Shue 1978; Sussman 
2005), and how new forms of torture techniques have emerged (McCoy 2007; Rejali 
2007).  But a study that examines how we have come to understand torture the way we 
do, and what influence the torture taboo has in world politics has been sorely 
neglected. This thesis makes a contribution to the expanding constructivist literature by 
examining the role morality plays in shaping identities, interests and actions in 
international society. My goal is to examine the origins and development of the torture 
taboo from the eighteenth to the twenty-first century to understand how we have come 
to understand torture and the possibilities immanent in the present that can help abolish 
torture in world politics. Building upon the work of Asad (1997, 2003), what I seek to 
show is that a history of the torture taboo is both a story of prohibiting unnecessary 






The Problem of Torture in World Politics 
How am I to proceed in showing that the torture taboo matters? The dissonance 
between the torture prohibition and its violation in practice raises fundamental 
questions about the nature of international politics and the ability of norms, rules and 
institutions in international society to prohibit unnecessary harm. The torture 
prohibition is a jus cogens international norm,
1
 and is embedded in major humanitarian 
and international human rights laws.
2
 The apparent disregard for the torture taboo 
initially lends support to the realist understanding that power and competition 
dominate the state system. Thucydides (1972, 402) in the Melian Dialogue 
demonstrated the consequences of the inequality of power amongst states whereby “the 
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept.” While, centuries later, Machiavelli (2003) had little time for the importance of 
morality, arguing the exercise of cruelty can help hold on to political power.  
 Although modern realists do not take such positions regarding the use of 
cruelty for political purposes, they do continue to offer a pessimistic view as to the role 
moral norms, such as the torture taboo, play in international politics (Gilpin 1984, 290; 
Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 10). For structural (neo) realists, the international anarchical 
system conditions states to preference their self-interest and survival ahead of moral 
principles. Because there is no global leviathan to prevent states hurting one another, 
                                                          
1
 Also known as a peremptory international norm. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties (1969) defines a peremptory norm as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character” (see also 
Malanczuk [1970] 1997, 57). 
2
 See Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 99 of the Third Geneva 
Convention and Common Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949; Article 7 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 2(2) of the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Article 3 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Article 5(2) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights; Article 5 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture; Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; and Article 7, 8 and 55 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
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the constant possibility of force means states exist “in the brooding shadow of 
violence” (Waltz 1979, 102). The freedom of states generates insecurity and mistrust 
as the “self-help” system leads to a constant struggle for power and domination among 
states (Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 10-12; Waltz 1979, 105,112). The torture taboo has 
failed to effectively restrain states because the material conditions of anarchy force 
states to preference material and security interests over moral values (Mearsheimer 
1994-1995, 10; Williams 2005, 109). Moral norms, if they are talked about at all, are 
cheap talk that are acknowledged in public but dismissed in private (Desch 2003, 417).
 Classical realists, seen most prominently in the work of Morgenthau, provide 
more of a role for morality in world politics, but continue to remain doubtful as to the 
ability of morality to weaken the struggle for power. Differing themselves from 
structural realism by focusing on the state’s will to power (Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 9 
fn20), classical realism sees morality as acting as an exogenous restraint on state action 
(Morgenthau 1993, 224-249). Both Morgenthau (1993, 225) and Carr (2001, 92) 
argued that one must focus on both power and morality in world politics to see that 
states cannot actually do as much as they would like to do. A state, for example, does 
not use mass extermination to defeat its enemy’s population; not because it is not 
strategically effective, but because it is wrong (Morgenthau 1993, 226-228).  
 During peacetime, morality has provided a constraint on the use of force and a 
realist may argue that the torture taboo has been effective here. However, it is when the 
taboo clashes with state interests and necessities that the “perennial forces” 
(Morgenthau 1993, 12) inherent in politics make it difficult to be both politically 
successful and uphold the torture prohibition. Morgenthau (1945b, 11-12) argued that 
we face an imperfect world that imposes conflicting moral and ethical demands upon 
us, both in relation to the self, and to others. This tension means that when we act in 
the world we cannot help but violate some moral principles in order to adhere to others 
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(Morgenthau 1945b, 11). By simply acting in the world, it corrupts our good intentions 
and destroys our integrity (Morgenthau 1945b, 11).      
 This tragedy is exacerbated in the political sphere. The human being is an 
animus dominandi that is either being dominated or seeking power to dominate others 
(Morgenthau 1945b, 5, 13-14). This makes the art of political ethics a practice in doing 
evil: “To the degree in which the essence and aim of politics is power over man, 
politics is evil; for it is to this degree that it degrades man to a means for other men” 
(Morgenthau 1945b, 14). However, acting in an immoral world does not give the 
statesman free reign to do what one likes. To act morally in the political sphere one 
must not chase moral abstracts but act according to the political reality of the time and 
carry out the lesser evil of the acts available (Morgenthau 1945b, 13; Murray 1996, 
104-105).          
 For the statesman, who has obligations and duties to protect the state’s 
interests, the pursuit of the national interest is the highest moral act. To act morally is 
to pursue power and conduct one’s affairs according to state interests and necessity. As 
Kissinger (1994, 61) argued, “states do not receive credit in any world for doing what 
is right; they are only rewarded for being strong enough to do what is necessary.” 
States are in constant competition and promoting human rights at the expense of the 
national interest can harm state interests (Loriaux 1992, 415; Morgenthau 1993, 245-
249). One must not be surprised then, argues the realist, when states have to 
compromise on upholding human rights when security concerns come to the fore 
(Desch 2003, 417-418; Linklater 2011, 122-127; Loriaux 1992, 415-416; Morgenthau 
1993, 245-249; Walt 2001-2002). One can better hope to limit unnecessary harm by 
practicing prudence through self-restraint, respecting the interests of others, and 
recognising limits of power (Linklater 2011, 123; Lang 2007; Hulsman and Lievan 
2005). For Gilpin (1984, 304), “this moral scepticism joined to a hope that reason may 
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one day gain greater control over passions constitutes the essence of realism and unites 
realists of every generation.”        
 Realism provides a powerful means to understand the current problem of 
torture in world politics. It helps explain why repeated attempts at prohibiting torture 
have failed because such efforts do not take into account the weakness of norms and 
law or the incessant struggle for power among states. Moreover, it makes valuable 
contributions in showing how morality can act as a constraint on behaviour and how 
the conflict between different moral obligations and duties can contribute to violations. 
In addition, the realist argument is strongly supported by the fact that empirically, not 
many examples have been provided to demonstrate that moral norms have trumped 
material interests or power (Desch 2003, 418-419).     
 However, without leaving realism behind, this narrative does not adequately 
explain the influence humanitarian pressures have on states, especially during norm 
violations. As Linklater (2011, 127) argues, it is unwise to ignore realist warnings that 
“necessity” will often trump concerns about moral norms but equally unwise to ignore 
normative developments that have helped constrain the ability to harm in world 
politics. States hide, deny, re-define and outsource their use of torture to hide the fact 
they have violated the torture taboo. Moreover, states have increasingly adopted no-
touch torture techniques to further hide evidence torture has taken place (Rejali 2007). 
This behaviour goes beyond material interests and demonstrates the pressure of a 
constitutive normative framework in action (Frost 2008, 142-147).  States know what 
they are doing is wrong and seek to hide their torture to avoid the stigma and public 
outrage that come with the violation of norms. To better understand these humanitarian 
pressures and how they offer hope of escape from the realist logic of anarchy, I would 
now like to show how constructivism can offer a more fruitful understanding of the 
power of the torture taboo.  
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Torture, International Society and the Study of Violations 
States are not just guided by the interests of gaining power and necessity; they are part 
of a socially constructed international society that shapes states through norms, rules 
and institutions (Bull 1995; Dunne 1995). Hedley Bull (1995, 8-19) argued there are 
common interests and values among states that help maintain international order. It is 
an international society that, “although precarious and imperfect” (Bull 1995, 50), 
helps to maintain order by seeking (among other things) to limit violence and war (see 
Bull 1995, 16-19).         
 Yet, there are also common values and norms among humankind as a whole, 
which Bull called world international society (Bull 1995, 36-38). World international 
society concerns the common values and interests reflective of Kantian principles of 
human solidarity and universalism (Bull 1995, 36-37). For Bull, world order is morally 
prior to international order because world order is based on “human beings, which are 
permanent and indestructible” (Bull 1995, 21). It is these values, such as human rights, 
or the humanitarian laws of war, that are integral to understanding why states torture in 
secret and why the torture taboo matters in world politics. As will become apparent 
throughout this thesis, the reason this is so is because these norms help to discipline 
and constitute actor identities and interests and provide legitimacy for their actions (see 
Clark 2005, 2007; Hurd 1999; Wheeler 2000).     
 The torture taboo still matters during violations because conditions of necessity 
are not void of these humanitarian principles and norms. Important work has been 
carried out in the last several decades that show that conditions of war do not absolve 
the environment of moral content (Katzenstein 1996a; Walzer 1978). Walzer (1978) in 
particular has shown to great effect that war is a moral domain that involves 
judgements about good and bad, right and wrong, and moral dilemmas of how one 
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ought to act in particular circumstances. This thesis draws upon this work to show that 
humanitarian pressures from the taboo continue to operate on states, even when they 
violate the norm. Although it is generally acknowledged that violations of a norm do 
not necessarily invalidate it (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 766-769; Kowert and Legro 
1996, 484-5; Sandholtz 2008, 108-109), studies have neglected whether one can find 
the strength of a norm by examining its violation.
3
 How, then, can studying violations 
offer a means to study the strength of the torture taboo?     
 Norm violations are a site of justification for behaviour and such justifications 
can demonstrate the evidence of a norm. One may interpret the hypocrisy of states 
regarding the torture taboo as evidence of the weakness of the taboo and evidence that 
moral norms represent hot air in world politics. In its 1973 global Report on Torture, 
Amnesty International (1973, 17) wrote, “It is significant that torture is the one form of 
violence today that a state will always deny and never justify. The state may justify 
mass murder and glorify those that kill as killers, but it never justifies torture nor 
glorifies those that torture as torturers.” Yet these “communicative trails” of lying and 
denying are not just fig leaves but evidence of a norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
892). As Finnemore (1996a, 159) notes, this discourse is “literally an attempt to 
connect one’s actions to standards of justice, or, perhaps more generically, to standards 
of appropriate and acceptable behaviour.”      
 The normative framework of the taboo places limits upon state behaviour. 
Although the norm is still violated, states cannot do as much as would be possible if no 
norm existed at all. It is this counter-factual that helps understand the power of the 
taboo. The hiding and denying of torture is explained not just by the constraining 
function of the taboo, but also by its constitutive function (see Frost 2008, 142-147). 
The taboo constitutes one’s identity as a “civilized” state. Actors who violate the taboo 
                                                          
3
 A notable exception is Price (1997, 134-163). 
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realise torture is inappropriate behaviour and that openly challenging the taboo is to 
call into question one’s identity as a “civilized” state. Torture is denied and secret 
because it is not something “we” do. This can impact on some of the most brutal and 
powerful states. For example, as I show in Chapter 2, the Nazis and the Soviet Union 
refused to admit to torture or openly challenge the taboo because they feared the 
impact it would have on their legitimacy and international reputation.  
 To violate the taboo has serious consequences for both a state’s identity and its 
policies. The political blowback that can come from violating valued moral principles 
can harm state strategies and bring about norm conformity. In Chapter 4 I show how 
France employed torture in French Algeria to defeat the FLN independence movement. 
This provoked moral outrage in segments of the French population who feared France 
was facing degeneration into a barbarous state. The domestic pressure in conjunction 
with international outrage contributed to the decision for France to withdraw from 
Algeria, despite significant military victories.      
 The most powerful states are not immune from the consequences of norm 
violations. Although one may argue that the US violated the torture taboo during the 
“war on terror” with minimum impunity, this ignores the fact that the US suffered 
severe damage to its international reputation (Roberts 2007, 200). The Abu Ghraib 
scandal and revelations of torture in Guantanamo Bay undermined the moral 
credibility of the US in the Middle East (Guardian 8 May 2004). Military strategists 
were continuing to claim that even by 2009, five years after Abu Ghraib broke news 
headlines, the US were still struggling to gain the confidence of the population in Iraq 
(Haaretz 29 Aug. 2009). International politics is not a situation whereby the strong do 
what they like while the weak do what they must; even the strongest face limits and 
negative consequences from violating moral principles in international society.  
 Finally, widespread violations of the taboo do not necessarily challenge the 
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norm; in fact, violations can offer an environment in which to strengthen the norm. I 
do not deny that violations can signify the emergence of new norms whereby the 
violated norms are no longer deemed in need of protection. But norm violations can 
also provide environments that facilitate condemnation, disputes and arguments that 
can assist in normative development (Checkel 2001; Risse 2000a; Sandholtz 
2008).The strength of the taboo can be seen by the fact that its most profound 
reconstructions in the twentieth century have been in response to large-scale 
inhumanity. The Nazi atrocities of World War II did not weaken the stigma of the 
torture taboo but strengthened it. Torture was condemned absolutely in the Nuremburg 
Trials and prohibited under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
1949 Geneva Conventions. Moreover, the debates that ensued in the immediate post-
war period further strengthened the normative stigma of the taboo by associating 
torture with “crimes against humanity,” which pose a threat to international peace and 
security. As I show in Chapter 3, the protection of the taboo was integral not only for 
international peace, but for individuals to experience the good life.   
 Similar events occurred when Amnesty International (1973, 1984) exposed the 
global violation of the torture taboo during the 1970s and 1980s. As a result of 
Amnesty International’s campaigns, the UN Convention against Torture was adopted 
in 1984, which established universal jurisdiction and the principle of non-refoulement. 
Despite widespread violations, the absolute prohibition against torture continued to 
remain standing. As I show in Chapters 3 and 4, these periods of violations forced a 
period of self-reflection upon actors in international society that demonstrated more 





Challenging the Realist Logic of Anarchy 
How does this argument help escape the realist logic of anarchy? The norm is still 
being violated, individuals are still being harmed, and one could argue this does not 
adequately challenge the realist logic that international politics is a struggle for power 
and security. So far I have argued the strength of the taboo can be seen by studying its 
violation. But what do I mean by strength? To understand strength as simply the ability 
of the norm to constrain actors would fall short in understanding the complex workings 
of the torture taboo. To help understand the taboo’s strength, I make a distinction 
between the constraining function of a norm and the legitimacy of a norm. Legitimacy 
helps to determine who a rightful member of international society is, and the 
appropriate way in which they are to behave (Clark 2005). It is the powerful 
legitimising role the taboo has in constituting rightful conduct and “civilized” 
identities that gives the taboo its strength. Despite the fact states have violated the 
torture taboo, the strength of the taboo’s legitimacy can still be seen by the measures 
states take to deny and hide norm violations, the public outcry that can be generated 
when torture is exposed, and the inability of states to openly challenge the taboo.  
 Although I do not deny that a violation of the taboo harms its constraining 
function, violations do not necessarily show the weakness of a norm. Simply focusing 
on the struggle for power ignores the ability for the taboo to moderate violence and act 
as a moral resource for actors to challenge the most powerful states. Power and 
material interests are not the only pressures placed on states during times of necessity. 
Studying violations to demonstrate the power of the taboo takes on the realist logic of 
anarchy in two ways. First, it highlights the strength of the torture taboo at the very site 
at which the realist argues it demonstrates its weakness. And second, it takes on the 
strong realist criticism that international relations scholarship on norms has only been 
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able to provide a few examples of where norms have constrained states. This is indeed 
a weakness of the constructivist literature and it is something I wish to ameliorate by 
showing that the normative framework can still influence and constrain states during 
norm violations.         
 Yet, this thesis also takes the position that the realist understanding of 
international relations is not a reflection of reality, but a socially constructed 
understanding of reality. Therefore, if we created this world, we can also change it. 
Constructivists examine the reflexive relationship between the social construction of 
reality and knowledge and the role power plays in linking the two (Guzzini 2000). The 
material and social world does not have any intrinsic meaning that human beings have 
access to; rather we create meaning through the co-constitution between agents and the 
social structure. The co-constitution of international society breaks away from the 
realist argument that anarchy is a battleground of violence. As Wendt (1992) argues, 
“anarchy is what states make of it.” This means that the structure is never out of the 
control of agents as such, but it does place constraints on the ability for change 
(Giddens 1984, 1-37).         
 These ontological and epistemological assumptions are combined with a third 
element of constructivism that argues identities and interests are constituted by the 
international normative and legal framework (Adler 1997; Price and Reus-Smit 1998; 
Reus-Smit 2004). Even though there are different types of constructivism,
4
 they all 
share these philosophical assumptions. By showing that norms constitute one’s identity 
it becomes easier to understand why norm conformity is not just generated by self-
interest or coercion. Norm conformity can also be because of the norm’s legitimacy or 
because it is what an actor ought to do (Checkel 2001; Hurd 1999; March and Olsen 
                                                          
4
 For Habermasian communicative theory, see Risse (2000a); for Bourdieu based theory, see Guzzini 
(2000); for Giddens structuration theory, see Wendt (1992) and Towns (2010); and for work that draws 
upon Nietzsche and Foucault, see Bartelson (1995) and Price (1997). 
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1998).           
 This thesis also builds upon the constructivist literature that has examined the 
role of prohibition norms in international politics (Nadelmann 1990; Price 1997, 1998; 
Tannenwald 2007), how norms evolve (Barkin 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), 
how they spread and are “taught” as part of a “world culture” (see Boli and Thomas 
1997; Boyle, McMorris and Gomez 2002; Finnemore 1993, 1996b; Meyer et al 1997a, 
1997b; Ramirez and Boli 1987) and how norms can be used to entrap and constrain 
states (Florini 2000; Klotz 1995; Lynch 2008). Moreover, I have drawn upon the work 
of those who have examined the constitutive, constraining and facilitating effects of 
legitimacy in world politics (Clark 2005, 2007; Hurd 1999; Wheeler 2000). States hide 
and deny their use of torture because torture violates important international norms and 
undermines one’s legitimacy in international society.    
 In addition, I have drawn upon the constructivist literature concerning norm 
contestation (Krook and True 2012; Sandholtz 2008; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 
2007; Wiener 2004, 2009) to show that internalised norms can become contested in 
practice. As I show in Chapters 5 and 6, adherence to internalised norms is not 
automatic, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 904) have suggested. Rather, a new battle 
occurs as states implement the norm. In this case, I show that as the normative 
framework of the torture taboo has become more robust over time, the site over its 
contestation has narrowed. States no longer openly contest whether there are 
exceptions to the prohibition, but contest what practices constitute torture. As I show 
in Chapters 5 and 6, this battle actually demonstrates the robustness of the taboo rather 
than its weakness.          
 By challenging the idea that international relations is just a repetition of 
violence, or that qualities of the international system are beyond the reach of agents, it 
opens up the possibility of change. As Wendt (1995, 80) states, if change “is possible, 
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then it would be irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetrate destructive old orders, 
especially if we care about the well-being of future generations.”     
 The torture taboo represents a symbol of the efforts taken by international 
society to abolish cruel and unnecessary suffering in world politics. Unlike the realist 
that would argue the widespread violation of the taboo is evidence of a lack of a 
society, the continuing strength of the taboo during violations demonstrates the 
evidence of an international society. Torture is hidden, denied and re-defined because 
torture cannot be justified in the national interest. The laws and norms of international 
society recognise that the torture taboo cannot be violated under any circumstance. The 
fact that the taboo is still taken into account and influences state actions, interests and 
identities during violations shows how these forces can be harnessed to help bring 
about change and offer hope of a new, more humane world order.   
 This thesis offers a novel account of how to see the strength of prohibition 
norms. Other accounts of norms have shown how the strength of a particular norm can 
be seen by the fact it was not violated even though it would have been in one’s 
material interests to do so (Price 1997; Tannenwald 2007). However, the history of the 
torture taboo has not been a result of a tradition of non-use; rather, it has become more 
robust in the face of violations. But what makes torture “taboo”? How and why has 
torture come to be considered so immoral? And how has it developed?  
  
The Torture Taboo 
What makes torture “taboo”? How does a taboo differ from a norm? I define norms as 
referring to standards and expectations of appropriate behaviour (Katzenstein 1996b, 5; 
Makinda 2003, 43). Taboos are norms, but not all norms are taboos. Taboos identify 
and classify transgressions that are concerned with “the sociology of danger” (Douglas 
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2002; Steiner 1999; Tannenwald 2007, 10). That is, taboos are concerned with 
crossing boundaries that result in untold danger (Steiner 1999, 189; Tannenwald 2007, 
11). To violate a taboo, according to the anthropological literature, is to bring about a 
social contagion effect that affects not only the violator but the wider community. 
Therefore, for Steiner (1999, 147), taboos localise danger “both by the specification of 
the dangerous and by the protection of society from endangered, and hence dangerous, 
persons” (Steiner 1999, 147). In localising and protecting individuals and the 
community from danger, taboos uphold “a vision of the good community” (Douglas 
2002, xx).         
 Seeing the torture taboo in terms of “the sociology of danger” provides a more 
nuanced understanding of torture and why it is prohibited. Torture is condemned not 
just because it is immoral but because it is dangerous. Torture is embedded in a 
network of classifications and categories of pain and suffering that help make the 
identification of a transgression (and hence danger behaviour) possible. It is not the 
infliction of pain and suffering per se that is deemed to be dangerous, but whether it is 
an excess and unnecessary infliction of pain.      
 It was the excess of pain that led the philosophes in the eighteenth century to 
see torture as dangerous to the social order. Torture undermined justice in the social 
contract by taking away too much liberty from citizens than was necessary to maintain 
order. Yet cruel and unnecessary punishments also transformed citizens into callous 
brutes and generated fears that one’s society would regress to a more barbarous age. 
By the twentieth century this danger was exacerbated as torture was condemned as a 
“crime against humanity” that posed a threat to international peace and security. One 
can see here the localisation of danger. The infliction of pain and suffering during 
warfare is deemed legitimate if carried out according to the laws of war; however, 
transgress these principles and one faces unforseen danger.     
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 The danger behaviour from transgressing the taboo is phenomenological: “The 
people can believe because they collectively want to believe” (Douglas 2002, xiii). The 
danger from a violation of the taboo is based on historically contingent inter-subjective 
beliefs and metaphors that help us interact with one another. Taboos tell us what is 
prohibited, thereby shaping our actions by indirectly telling us what is permitted. But 
what is so dangerous about torture? Why do we allow exceptions to using nuclear 
weapons or to the killing of other human beings but continue to condemn torture 
absolutely?          
 Since the eighteenth century the torture taboo has become a symbol that 
represents a set of values deemed in need of absolute protection for individuals to lead 
a fulfilling life. The taboo represents the Kantian principle that the individual must be 
treated as an end and never as a means (Kant 2005, 105). The taboo is therefore 
integral to world justice understood as those ideas linked to “the world common good” 
(Bull 1995, 81). Torture represents a particularly cruel form of pain and suffering that 
attacks the defenceless (Shue 1978) and violates the consent of the victim (Scarry 
1985). In Chapters 3 and 4, I show that the torture taboo became concerned with 
protecting the potential and capacity for individuals to enjoy the good life. Torture 
targets the personality and dignity of the individual, which are intertwined and 
constitute one another. In doing so, it seeks to destroy that part of the human being 
which is unique to each and every one of us, yet at the same time, are elements that we 
all share and which separate us from the rest of the animal kingdom. To torture, then, 
is not just to destroy a particular human being, but to destroy those elements common 
to all of us and of which we call humanity.      
 The torture taboo contains cosmopolitan values and principles that have several 
effects on states in world politics. As already discussed, the taboo seeks to constrain 
and discipline states by prohibiting torture absolutely. This is represented in extensive 
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prohibitions in international human rights law and humanitarian laws.
5
 Secondly, the 
taboo constitutes identities and interests of states and other actors in international 
society. To document a case of torture is an accusation against that state in which 
torture has occurred and poses a risk to that state’s identity. Since torture’s prohibition, 
torture has become a marker that has helped to distinguish “civilized” states, which 
have an absence of torture, from “barbarous” ones which do torture.  
 This leads to the third effect of the taboo. To violate the torture taboo is to 
breach these normative expectations and open up the opportunity to rank states as 
“barbaric” or “uncivilized.” I draw upon Dahrendorf (1968, 167-176) and Towns 
(2010) to show that wherever there exists norms that have attached an evaluative 
element relating to normative expectations in society, the sanction and reward 
behaviour used by society to maintain conformity and order has the by-product of 
ranking. This distinction between civilized and barbaric continues to operate today, 
and can be seen in the “extraordinary rendition” network whereby civilized states send 
detainees off to uncivilized countries for torture.     
 Giddens also draws attention to how social relations position people in relation 
to “categories and ties” that specify the “rights and obligations relevant to persons 
having a particular social identity” (Giddens 1984, 89).The torture taboo imposes 
positive and negative obligations on states. Under the UN Convention against Torture, 
states have the obligation to refrain from torturing or to send detainees off to countries 
where they are at risk of torture. But the Convention also imposes duties on states to 
take measures to prevent torture and punish torturers. The Convention recognises 
universal jurisdiction over the act of torture, meaning a state must either punish an 
individual suspected of torture or send them to a state that will. One cannot remain 
neutral regarding the use of torture.       
                                                          
5
 See footnote 2.  
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 Norms, then, both constrain and facilitate behaviour. In Chapter 2, I show how 
the obligations and duties of civilized states to prohibit torture in the non-European 
world legitimised and facilitated interventions in so-called barbarous societies to 
civilize backward peoples. To fail to fulfil both negative and positive obligations 
would have brought the legitimacy of the colonial “civilizing mission” into crisis. Yet 
it would have also damaged the colonial power’s identity as a civilized and responsible 
state. To help understand how the torture taboo developed these obligations and its 
stigma over time, I have employed a genealogical method of inquiry, something to 
which I now turn. 
 
Genealogical Method 
I stated above that the torture taboo represents Kant’s principle of always treating 
individuals as an end and never as a means. But how did the torture taboo come to be 
understood in this way? What factors led to torture’s stigma and how has its danger 
behaviour developed over time? I have used a genealogical study to help understand 
how torture came to appear as “naturally” barbaric. Genealogical studies challenge the 
idea that norms have a transcendent origin or authority. A genealogy examines how 
norms develop due to fortuitous events, historical accidents and contingencies we have 
all but forgotten (Bartelson 1995; Foucault 1991; Nietzsche 2003; Price 1997). This 
means that the meaning of the torture taboo is not found in its origins, but in particular 
historical moments that highlight changing epistemologies, metaphors and 
interpretations (Nietzsche 2003, 77-8).      
 A genealogy is first and foremost a history of the present. That is, it seeks to 
show how the present was formed (Bartelson 1995, 73-78). It moves away from 
presentism, which sees history develop to some sort of ideal, and also moves away 
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from finalism, which projects an image of the present onto the past (Bartelson 1995, 
54-55). A genealogy is an open ended inquiry and is intended to show “we are 
historical beings all the way down” (Bartelson 1995, 75, 78).    
 This methodology has important implications for the study of the torture taboo. 
A genealogy of the torture taboo helps trace the changing meaning of torture over time 
and destabilise the apparent fixed categories of unnecessary and cruel pain and 
suffering. My argument in this thesis is that there is no definitive definition of torture; 
nor is our aversion to torture “natural.” Rather I show that the meaning of torture, and 
hence the torture taboo, is an on-going social construction. For example, Elaine Scarry 
(1985) argues that the infliction of pain through torture represents a negation that 
destroys the human being. However, this has not always been the case. Up until the 
eighteenth century torture had been deemed a legitimate judicial practice. In fact, as I 
show in Chapter 1, during the ancien régime torture was deemed a way to gain the 
truth and offer the sinner salvation and redemption. It has only been recently (over the 
last two centuries) that torture has been understood as a negation of humanity. 
 A genealogical method is also useful to help understand how the taboo has 
become more robust in the face of its widespread violations. It has been fortuitous 
events and historical accidents that have helped the taboo become more robust over 
time. These include revolutions in the European criminal justice system and changing 
epistemologies of pain, developments in international law, European colonial policies 
and large-scale inhumanity. The torture taboo has also been constructed over centuries 
by a wide array of actors, including individuals, states, courts and international 
institutions. Human rights activists have played an important role in putting the torture 
taboo on the international agenda, documenting rights violations and pressuring states 
into norm conformity (see Finnemore 2009; Keck and Sikkink 1999; Lynch 2008; 
Risse 2000b, 203-204).        
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 In order to trace the development of the torture taboo, I have used what Price 
(1997, 9) has identified as “two of the genealogist’s analytical tools: discourses and 
power.” By discourses I refer to both language and practices (Foucault 2002; Gee 
2001). In terms of power, I draw upon the social constructivist understanding of power 
as the reflexive link between the social construction of reality and knowledge (Ashley 
1984, 259; Guzzini 2000). For Hopf (1998, 179) discourse has the “power to produce 
inter-subjective meaning within a social structure.” Discourses help to differentiate, 
classify and categorise meanings; that is, they make the world by organising perception 
and the social world itself (Bourdieu 1989, 22). Because power is about counter-
factuals, the ability to legitimise a particular interpretation of reality is an element of 
power (Guzzini 2000, 171-172).       
 By showing that the meaning of norms form part of an inter-subjective 
framework worked on by many actors, we can break away from the realist 
understanding that norms and international institutions reflect the interests of the 
powerful (Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 7). One can see this realist understanding of norms 
in E.H. Carr’s (2001, 75-81) analysis of the “harmony of interests” or Carl Schmitt’s 
(2007, 54) notion that those who act in the name of humanity wish to cheat. The realist 
framework ignores the fact that the production of knowledge often has autonomy from 
powerful states (Barnett and Finnemore 1999), inhibiting the ability for states to define 
norms however they like.         
 How are materially weak actors able to pressure the most powerful states into 
conforming to the taboo? As Foucault (2002, 55-56) notes, discourses are bound up 
with “sites” that legitimise discourse. These sites not only provide the speaker with a 
prestige to speak on a topic (such as a doctor on health), but also provide an assurance 
to the audience that what this authority is saying is true. For human rights groups such 
as Amnesty International, their authority relies heavily on their reputation as objective 
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and accurate (Scarry 1985, 9). This reputation is reinforced when international 
institutions such as the United Nations or the European Court of Human Rights rely on 
human rights reports to make their own decisions relating to torture (see Forowicz 
2010, 217-228; Kelly 2009). Courts draw upon legal expertise and the appearance of 
politically neutral discourse for their authority. Courts have the ability to determine 
whether torture has taken place under the law, how torture is to be distinguished from 
other practices, and the ability to legitimise an interpretation of the law upon society 
that can set standards for future conduct (see Bourdieu 1986-1987). Medical 
physicians gain their authority through knowledge of the body and the ability to 
recognise and document cases of torture, their ability to engage in differential 
diagnoses and their ability to associate bodily symptoms and scars with particular 
methods of torture (Istanbul Protocol 1999, 33-34). It is this authority that provides 
these actors with the ability to exercise social power, and in doing so, challenge the 
most powerful states into conforming to the taboo.      
 The reflexive relationship between the construction of reality and knowledge 
and the linkage of power is integral in understanding the normative developments of 
the taboo, how it has become distinguished from other forms of pain and suffering, and 
how torture has developed its strong stigma over time. However, in engaging in a 
genealogical analysis that removes transcendent origins of the taboo, does one lose the 
ability to approve or disapprove of torture in international society? Undertaking a 
genealogy does not necessarily mean that one has to reject what is being studied 
(Guess 2002, 212). To suggest there is no such thing as transcendent norms does not 
mean that “anything goes” or that morality is no longer binding. In fact, Nietzsche 
(2006, 159) condemned such arguments as “childish follies.” Genealogy is not a 
neutral endeavour but a value laden one that is directed toward enlightenment and 
emancipation (Owen 2002). It seeks to show how the taboo has helped constitute who 
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we are today, and how the taboo shapes and regulates our actions in world politics. The 
history of the torture taboo is a political struggle between different actors that has vital 
importance for the recognition of a violation of human dignity.    
 To show that the torture taboo developed because of fortuitous events is not the 
same as arguing that it is has no value in international society. Nor is it to suggest that 
agency plays no role in creating the taboo’s history. The case studies throughout this 
thesis show how states and non-state actors have played a powerful role in 
reconstructing and strengthening the taboo. What a genealogy shows is that our actions 
often have unintended consequences that can shape the international system in 
profound ways.          
 I have chosen several case studies to trace the torture taboo. However, I do not 
pretend that this is a complete history of the taboo. There are many examples of torture 
around the world and therefore I had to limit the case studies to the one’s most relevant 
to the task at hand. I have provided three reasons for choosing the case studies in this 
thesis. First, I have analysed cases that have offered the opportunity for discussion 
about the meaning of torture and how international society should deal with it. 
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on absolutist Europe and the expansion of nineteenth century 
European international society to show how torture came to be prohibited and how its 
stigma as a barbarous practice was worked on through colonial practices. Chapters 3 
and 4 also focus on important moments in the reconstruction of the taboo by focusing 
on the Nuremburg Trials, the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the 1984 UN Convention against Torture. These case studies helped to strengthen 
the categorisation of torture as immoral and dangerous behaviour as well as strengthen 
the taboo under international law.      
 Second, these case studies offer the opportunity to analyse the different 
strategies states have used to hide their torture. These strategies include secrecy, 
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denial, re-defining, outsourcing and using no-touch techniques that do not leave marks 
on the body. Focusing on these strategies is intended to show how the taboo has 
become more robust over time. Chapter 2 shows how the Soviet Union and the Nazis 
had to deny their use of torture to prevent damage to their international standing. 
Although hiding and denying of torture continues to occur today, there has also been 
the emergence of re-defining torture under international law so that states no longer 
have to take measures to hide it. As I show in Chapters 5 and 6, Israel and the United 
States sought to re-define torture. But in doing so, they legitimised the torture taboo by 
reaffirming that torture was absolutely prohibited. This has now led to a situation 
where the torture taboo has become internalised in international society but contested 
in practice.          
 Thirdly, I have focused on cases that have resulted in public condemnation of 
torture to show the negative blowback effects torture has on states that use it. In 
Chapter 4, I show how the use of torture by France in Algeria generated domestic and 
international criticism. This undermined France’s legitimacy to rule Algeria and 
contributed to French withdrawal. In Chapters 5 and 6, the public condemnation from 
re-defining torture forced both Israel and the United States to drop their controversial 
interrogation programs. For the US, the Abu Ghraib scandal had profound implications 
on their military strategy and legitimacy in the Middle East.   
 To support my argument, I have drawn upon a vast set of primary and 
secondary materials in this thesis. This includes newspapers, government 
memorandums, United Nations documents, court trials, human rights reports, 
government commissioned reports on torture, memoirs, as well as international 
relations literature, philosophy, and anthropology. I have relied as much as possible on 
primary sources to help understand how actors understood torture in particular 
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historical moments and how this understanding has shaped actor’s actions, interests 
and identities in international society.  
 
Chapter Outline 
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 focuses on the abolition of torture. It 
analyses the use of torture in the ancien régime when it was a legitimate judicial 
practice and the factors that eventually led to its prohibition. Chapter 2 shows how the 
torture taboo became more robust in relation to developments under international law 
and European colonialism during the nineteenth century. I then turn to an analysis of 
the torture taboo in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to show that despite its 
violation, the torture taboo still mattered. Chapter 3 details how the taboo actually 
became more robust after Nazi atrocities during World War II through the Nuremburg 
Trials and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The fourth Chapter turns to the 
use of torture by France in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 to demonstrate how the 
taboo influenced the outcome of the war. The second half of the chapter focuses on the 
1984 UN Convention against Torture, showing again that the taboo managed to 
strengthen in the face of widespread violations. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the use of 
torture by Israel and the United States to show how both states manipulated 
international law to better define torture to reflect their interests. I also examine the use 
of “extraordinary renditions” by the US (Chapter 6), which has helped establish a 
hierarchy in international society between the “civilized” states that send detainees off 
to “uncivilized” countries for torture.       
 All these chapters link up to tell a story of how the taboo has developed and the 
role it plays in world politics. I show how torture has transformed from a legitimate 
practice to a prohibited one; how the strategies states have used to hide their torture 
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have become more sophisticated; and the developments under international law that 
have helped make the taboo. The Conclusion examines what implications this thesis 
has for theory and practice, the measures that can be taken to further strengthen the 
taboo into the future and the normative visions immanent in the present that can be 
harnessed to create a more humane social order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
